Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Faculty Publications and Research

CMC Faculty Scholarship

10-1-2016

Why Has “Development” Become a Political Issue
in Indian Politics?
Aseema Sinha
Claremont Mckenna College

Recommended Citation
Aseema Sinha, “Why Has “Development” Become a Political Issue in Indian Politics?” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. XXIII (1),
(15 pages), Fall-Winter 2016.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CMC Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion
in CMC Faculty Publications and Research by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact
scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

Why Has “Development”
Become a Political Issue in
Indian Politics?
Aseema Sinha

Wagener Chair of South Asian Politics
Claremont McKenna College

Most observers of India have an implicit model of how Indians vote.1 They
assume that voters in India act on their primary identities, such as caste or
community, and that parties seek votes based on group identities—called vote
banks—that can be collated into majorities and coalitions. K.C. Suri articulates the logic of this dominant model:
People of this country vote more on the basis of emotional issues or
primordial loyalties, such as caste, religion, language or region and less
on the basis of policies. The victory or defeat of a party depends on how
a party or leaders marshal support by appealing to these sentiments or
forge coalitions of groups and parties based on these feelings. People
of India, unlike in the West, do not think and act as classes, and they
vote for the party or leader they think their own, regardless of its or
his policies.2
Scholarship on India has accumulated strong evidence that elections are permeated by caste, language, religion, and identity politics.3 The prominence of
parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul
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Muslimeen (AIMIM), organized around Dalits and Muslims respectively,
seems to confirm this dominant model. India also has many regional parties,
such as DMK, AIADMK, and AGP.4 The two major parties—the Congress
Party and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—also constantly seek to signal religious, caste-driven, and identity-based ideas and policies at the local level in an
effort to garner political power. Similarly, intermediate and discriminated caste
groups mobilize around caste identity to seek political representation.
Some recent examples confirm that caste logic is still important. On 6
July 2015, in the western state of Gujarat, Hardik Patel, a young (21 years old)
unknown leader, began an agitation challenging both reservations for backward
groups and demanding the inclusion of Patidars (a dominant farmer caste group
in Gujarat) in the larger “other
Editors of the English press argue that backward castes” (OBC) list.5
current Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Simultaneously, in August
2015, a rally organized by the
government should reenergize eco- Patels (a dominant farming
nomic growth and ensure fiscal stability. caste) of Gujarat led to caste
riots. More recently, as of February 2016, violence instigated by the Jats (a farming caste) of Haryana led to
190
approximately 30 deaths and 170 injuries in Haryana and Delhi.6 Even Delhi’s
water supply was affected by the violence for a week. Shops and malls were set
on fire, and rampaging rioters roamed the streets. Jats, a powerful and wealthy
caste, wanted to be categorized as an OBC, thus granting them eligibility for
reservations in government jobs and colleges. The recently concluded Assam
elections of 2016 emphasized a form of identity politics organized around the
plight of a Khilonjia—an original inhabitant of Assam. This politics, grounded
in an aversion to migrants from Bangladesh, and the need for Assam to focus
on the identity of the “original Assamese,” may be the key to understanding
why BJP won by a landslide in Assam in 2016.7
Yet countervailing tendencies are also apparent. During the general elections of 2014, Delhi elections of 2013 and 2015, and the Bihar election of
2015, party officials, media outlets, and voters all debated development and
related issues. Economic growth, employment, and access to public goods such
as infrastructure, electricity, education, and healthcare have started to dominate electoral discourse and political discussions in India. How can we understand this apparent shift in Indian political economy? Why has Indian political
discourse moved away from caste and identity politics to incorporate development issues?8
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Perhaps the first question we need to address is: what is development and
how do different stakeholders in India view it? Bloggers, economists, and editors of the English press argue that current Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s
government should reenergize economic growth and ensure fiscal stability.9
These development narratives look outward to global aspirations of being a
rising power that India’s high growth rate has helped propel. The Westernoriented middle class’ circulation of these ideas is partly driven by personal
material concerns and partly shaped by the positive reception that India has
received in foreign capitals. However, other sections of India’s population—the
neo-middle class, perhaps, as well as poorer and lower classes—do not privilege
growth over equity and distributional issues. They want both rising incomes
and better schools.10 Indian voters are no longer single-issue voters, thinking
only through the lens of community or ethnic group identities, but have also
begun to vote on their rising economic aspirations and their need for better social infrastructure (schools and health) as well as physical infrastructure (roads
and access to electricity).
In this article, I explore the emergence of development as a distinct issueaxis in Indian politics. This idea deploys William Riker’s theory of the emergence of a new issue space as a means to analyze development in India. Riker
offered an interesting modification of the dominant spatial model of voting:
Beyond these actions of voters, participants (either candidates or voters)
might change the space itself, distorting it by adding or subtracting
dimensions or by expanding dimensions as if they were elastic or
elastic in certain distances. Adding or subtracting dimensions always
changes the shape of the space and distribution of voters. Distorting
dimensions need not change the relative position of voters, but in two
dimensions it can easily affect the relative location of the center of the
distribution, and in higher dimensions it can significantly change the
kinds of coalitions.11
Essentially, Riker recognized the role of party strategy and rhetoric in creating
new issue dimensions in politics. In India, I contend that a new issue dimension of development has been introduced in elections and in political discourse
more generally, and the Indian electoral issue-space is no longer one-dimensional.
It must be acknowledged at the outset that development issues compete
with, but do not displace, caste and religious identities in Indian politics. Even
candidates chosen for their ability to appeal to their caste and community
must speak the language of development. Elected politicians are being evaluat-
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ed based on their ability to deliver jobs, roads, and public goods, but they also
use patronage and personal appeals to their identity groups. Various developmental narratives discipline Indian parties and politicians. However, patronage
is no longer an effective method of securing votes; Indian voters take money
and other cash goods and vote their choices. Academic research is beginning to
acknowledge that patronage is ineffective at vote-getting, and therefore politicians are forced to seek support by promising long-term change.12
A Move Toward Development?
Slowly but surely, voters are demanding a focus on development, economic
policies, and public goods in addition to identity politics. Voters are no longer
voting only along caste lines. In 2014, surveyors found that economic growth,
corruption, and inflation were the most salient issues among voters during the
2014 general elections for the sixteenth Lok Sabha (lower house of the Indian
Parliament).13 The recently held assembly elections confirm these findings.
Though identity mobilization was a factor in Assam, development was the
dominant issue both in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu. In West Bengal, politician
Mamata Banerjee recast herself as a people-oriented development chief minister,
192
effectively going beyond the legacy of Singur, when her party, the Trinamool
Congress (TMC), was seen as “anti-development.” In 2007–08, protests had
erupted in Singur, West Bengal against a Tata automobile factory. Organized and
supported by TMC, these protests ultimately led Tata to leave West Bengal and
set up a factory in Gujarat.14 In 2016, TMC has been keen to move away from
that legacy and make development
Even candidates chosen for their the main focus of their campaign,
ability to appeal to their caste publicizing varied policies that
a n d c o m m u n i t y m u s t s p e a k would benefit the poor: subsidized
rice schemes, bicycles for female
the language of development. students, and construction of
roads.15 As noted by Surjit Bhalla in the Indian Express: “It is just that, unknown
to the Congress and the Left but known to everyone else, the voter is demanding
the same from all politicians: infrastructure, [electricity], jobs, and [water].
The voter is saying give us development, stupid. And, only the stupid are not
listening.”16 Banerjee’s party won 211 of the 294 available seats and 49 percent
of the vote. Voters kept repeating: “Didi [elder sister] has brought roads to rural
Bengal.”17
Interestingly, diffusion processes are also at work. Parties and leaders are
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learning from each other, and states and regional leaders are adapting development projects from their neighbors and other states. Borrowing a strategy
from Bihar’s cycle program, TMC distributed bicycles with the TMC logo to
schoolchildren.18 They also adopted the “2kg rice scheme,” which provides two
kilograms of rice to every household below a certain income threshold, from a
similar initiative announced by a series of parties in Tamil Nadu in the 1980s
and 1990s.19 Politicians may not deliver everything they promise, but the discourse of politics has shifted to that of development and livelihood issues.
While speeches about development and public goods are necessary, they
alone may not be enough: parties need the organizational and administrative
muscle to implement these new programs. TMC, for example, has put a lot of
effort into capturing panchayats (local government councils) in rural areas and
has sponsored new local clubs to counter the cadre-based mobilization of the
erstwhile ruling party, the Communist Party-Marxist (CPM).20 TMC has lobbied, fought, and tried to bring panchayat leaders into its party. As more and
more panchayat bodies fall under its control, it uses their development budgets
to distribute the provisions for roads and other goods on the ground.
These tendencies have reverberated throughout India’s political landscape.
In some areas of the country, development schemes, such as funds for roads
and electricity, coexist with “cash for votes” arrangements, where politicians
promise cash goods such as television sets to voters. Indian voters, however, are
astute: they accept such promises, and since the secret ballot is well implemented, vote for the party whom they want to vote for.21 In Bihar, the government
initiated a scheme in 2007 where schoolgirls could obtain a check of 2,000 rupees to buy a bicycle upon passing the eighth grade. The Bihar government has
spent 174.36 crores (1.74 billion rupees) on this scheme in the past three years,
allowing 871,000 girls to travel to school more easily.22 A monitoring mechanism is built into the program: the number of ninth-grade girls registered in
Bihar’s high schools went from 175,000 in 2007 to 600,000 in 2012, while
school drop out rates declined significantly. During the 2014 elections, talk of
the “Gujarat model of development” led Jayaraman Jayalalithaa, the then-chief
minister of Tamil Nadu, to speak about her state’s success in ensuring development for its citizens as a different approach.23 Bihar’s Chief Minister Nitish
Kumar also spoke of his development achievements: “In Bihar, all girls enrolled
in government schools are given money for uniforms and scholarships. Boys
and girls in class 9 and 10 are given money to buy bicycles. Does Mr. Modi’s
Gujarat provide this?”24
There is some reason to believe that this is a long-term trend: Indians
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show an increasing desire to vote based on projected development outcomes
rather than on their primary identities, as they had in previous elections. James
Manor argues that we are witnessing the emergence of a post-clientelist system.25 Similarly, Vasundhra Sirnate and Pradeep Chibber note that:
In 2011, a survey in Uttar Pradesh asked voters whether they preferred
leaders who could govern to those with whom they had a jati/biradari
[caste/community] relationship. Seventy percent of respondents
preferred a politician who could deliver public goods and “govern;”
and only 20 percent said that they would like someone from their
jati/biradari as a political leader. There were no statistically significant
differences in these responses between Hindus, Muslims, Dalits, upper
castes, and other backward castes (OBCs).26
Many other prominent editors and commentators concur. Pratap Mehta, the
president of the Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, notes:

194

[Voters] are choosing empowerment over patronage, the future over
the past, performance over rhetoric, sincerity over cynicism, rootedness
over disembodied charm, measured realism over flights of fantasy.
They are carefully assessing alternatives through the prism of local
circumstances. Identities still matter, but voters are no longer prisoners
of those identities.27
Carolyn Elliot discusses how the state of Andhra Pradesh is moving from clientelistic politics to more of a welfare state model.28 An analysis of the 2004 and
2009 elections showed that voters’ perception of the performance of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, rather than their class and social
origins, explained electoral outcomes across all levels.29 Adam Auerbach and I
argue that India is witnessing the rise of a distinct type of clientelism: “developmental clientelism,” where voters reward the provision of public goods and
developmental services even by their community-oriented patrons. We also
suggest that, under some conditions, patron-client relationships may serve developmental ends—for example, the midday meal scheme in schools in Tamil
Nadu, intended as a patronage good for voters, increased literacy levels in the
state.30
Why Has This Shift Happened?
India has undergone a quiet social and economic revolution in the last 30 years.
The decline of the Nehru model of a state-dominated economy, economic
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reforms, increasing levels of literacy, and rising urbanization rates have jointly
produced an explosion of rising expectations among Indian voters across a
broader set of social groups, thus creating a growing demand for good governance
and public services. Simultaneously, intense democratic competition has become
a motivating factor for responsiveness from political elites. Together, these factors
have created the push toward development. Thus, I outline two distinct supplyside and demand-side mechanisms that have driven the shift from identity to
developmental politics and the creation of a new issue-dimension in Indian
politics.
A Demand-Led Explanation?
We are beginning to see the emergence of a contingent social coalition on
behalf of development and economic growth across India. This may be the
political effect of 26 years of economic reforms, which started in 1991. The
economic reforms of 1991 initiated domestic liberalization and the opening
up of the Indian economy. Paradoxically, this trend of demanding higher levels
of development speaks to the success of Manmohan Singh’s government in
focusing on the development of the common man and farmers. The Congress
Party lost the 2014 election not because it failed but because it succeeded too
well in bringing new groups into political life, such as the neo-middle classes
with rising developmental aspirations. Indian voters want more of what the
Congress government of 2004 promised. Their vote against the Congress Party
in 2014 may have been a “revolution of rising expectations” and aspirations,
rather than a criticism of the economic reforms.31 The Congress Party is facing
the consequences of its own success in creating a rights-based discourse around
development.
Rising expectations have created a desire for higher economic incomes
and consumption power among expanding sections of the Indian population. These are the middle classes and the neo-middle classes. At the same
time, those at the lower end of the earnings spectrum lack the collective action
mechanisms necessary to launch a concerted mobilization against the effects of
economic reform.32 Some of the economic losers, such as the urban and rural
poor, agricultural laborers, and informal sector workers are also starting to seek
incomes at the periphery of the semi-urban and urban economies, making
them less likely to oppose the process of economic reform. Thus, for somewhat
different reasons, both the winners and losers of this shift are beginning to
demand development: development has become the dominant game in town.
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The Middle Class and the Aspiring Middle Class
Many have argued that the reforms of 1991 benefited the old and emerging
middle classes.33 The middle classes have since then also grown and become more
differentiated. While their numbers have increased, new professional groups,
and the people who service them, have been incorporated within India’s middle
class topography. The Indian middle class consists of salaried professional classes,
civil servants and clerks, salaried employees of new private sector companies,
employees of public sector banks, call center employees, insurance agents,
and real estate brokers. Members of the Indian middle class certainly vote for
economic issues: they are supporters of both better roads to their localities,
electric power to their homes, better infrastructure, and access to modern means
of consumption. They also want privatized access to public services: gated
communities, generators for when the power goes off, and access to privatized
water and the multiplex malls around the city. They watch the stock market and
invest in its diverse products. Many sections of this group vote economically,
although they may also support a resurgent Hindu nationalist agenda.34
While the professional classes in major metropolitan centers such as Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata are all inserted into the mobile linkages of the global
196
economy, creating a transnational middle class, the lower sections—white collar
and salaried workers in the lower rungs of bureaucracies and the private sector,
clerks, administrators, drivers
A similar dynamic has created a new of the professional classes, and
underclass that supports economic sales personnel—seek to grow
their incomes and are an aspiliberalization and wants access to the rational middle class.35 These
public and club goods that the upper groups also support economic
middle class has garnered for itself. liberalization and the higher
incomes and consumption
power that come with it, even though they face increased vulnerability in newly volatile labor markets and urban spaces.36 They further demand a focus on
development by politicians and government policy.
We also need to understand the perspective of the lower-middle-class,
which has expanded the scope of the aspirational middle class, even though
the lifestyles of those in it are closer to those of the poor. These lower-middleclass actors perceive economic globalization as a beneficent force, even when
they may find greater economic problems in their own lives.37 While systematic studies of globalization have found a differing impact on lower castes and
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women, lower-middle-class women, at least, do not perceive economic liberalization to be “detrimental to their lives.”38 One reason for this lack of ill
will is that new entrants to the middle class have seen a rise in income and
opportunities even though their income stream may be more volatile. Shelley
Feldman’s 1992 study of women workers in export-processing zones found
that women from rural middle-strata families found new employment opportunities there.39 A similar dynamic is at work in many parts of India, creating
a new underclass that supports economic liberalization and wants access to the
public and club goods that the upper middle class has garnered for itself. This
lower middle class wants a share of the growing economy and would like more
public goods and club goods—jobs—for their group.
Rural Migrants, The Urban Poor, and Informal Sector Workers
When we think of economic reform in India, we tend to think of the IT sector, engineering, and pharmaceuticals. Yet, by now, sectors that were usually
considered less important—such as tourism, consumer goods, and the communication economy—have helped create rising incomes and, even more
strikingly, rising aspirations. In West Bengal for example, urban cities are not
only the homes of the middle classes, but also those of migrants and aspiring
middle-class voters who engage in the informal economy. Auto-rickshaw and
taxi unions, hawkers, and service providers to the urban middle classes have
emerged as the new vote banks of urban India. These voters have different
demands: they want roads to link their rural residencies with urban areas, and
they want the state to do its job in providing basic public services. In some
parts of the country—though not all—many agricultural residents, farmers,
and even children of landlords have moved to urban and semi-urban towns,
becoming consumers and service workers on the fringes of the new economy.
These voters have much greater access to modern technologies and cell phones,
allowing them to cultivate the social and political skills needed to demand different kinds of development goods. Overall, a new axis of developmental politics has emerged, where winners from the economic reforms, but also aspiring
winners, seek to achieve their economic desires and aspirations. A developmental axis has displaced, if not replaced, the issue of identity and caste politics.
What about Rising Inequality and Poverty?
Together, these groups and classes constitute a nascent social coalition of win-
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ners and aspiring winners. While this social coalition is broader than most
critics anticipated when liberalization began, liberalization has also created new
pockets of stagnation in which people are confronted with their neighbors’
rising incomes and the realization that this new prosperity has failed to lift all
boats. The benefits of economic liberalization fell to very specific social and
economic groups—those able to use urban-rural linkages to move out of rural
areas; those based in urban areas, those able to use higher education in urban
and foreign centers for social mobility; and those able to move into sectors that
became more tightly linked to the global and urban economy.
This revolution of rising aspirations has also created new losers and groups
that want a piece of the cake that eludes them. Some of the erstwhile-dominant
castes and classes in rural areas now find themselves disenfranchised from the
new urban global economy. The Patels of Gujarat and the Jats of Haryana are
examples of such groups. Agricultural workers are also losers in this economy,
especially in areas where the new, non-farm economy has not deepened and
where rural workers depend only on farm income. These groups may not have
benefited from the new economy as much as the transnational middle classes,
but they nevertheless want a share of it. It is within these pockets of stagnation that we find support for new caste reservations, symbolized by the agitations of Gujarat’s Patels and Haryana’s Jats. This larger developmental dynamic
may explain dual, seemingly paradoxical, phenomena: the rise of development
in the mainstream political discourse of India and a backlash that mobilizes
caste groups in urban centers along with once-dominant castes in rural India.
Thus, winners and aspiring winners seek development, but new losers of the
economic reform trajectory align with old style economic and social power.
These powerful caste groups are reverting to the language of “competitive backwardization” and caste-based mobilization to address their declining wages and
declining opportunities.40 This explains the dual contradictory effect: the formation of a new issue space of development in Indian politics but also the
reemergence of identity-driven, caste-based mobilization among some losers.
How do Parties and Politicians Respond? A Politician’s Dilemma
Since 1989, when coalition governments became more common, the political
marketplace of India’s democracy has become fragmented, volatile, and uncertain. The structure of democratic competition has been marked by the decline of the Congress Party, the rise of coalition and regional parties, and antiincumbent trends. This has led to a marked anti-incumbency bias in Indian
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politics. Many scholars have observed this increased political uncertainty and
volatility.41 Yet parties are finding that the practice of “ethnic headcounting”—
when parties target different ethnic groups for policies and patronage—does
not work any more.42 A “revolution of rising expectations” has called upon parties and politicians to respond to this perfect storm in Indian political economy.
Politicians may thus be compelled to “overbid” on public expenditure,
and provide—or promise to provide—longer-term public goods, such as education and infrastructure.43 Even more interestingly, new classes, groups, and
parties are emerging in response to the new mood and demands of Indian politics. The success of the AAP (Aam Admi Party, or the Common Man’s Party) is
a direct illustration of this trend. The AAP created a new issue dimension in the
electoral discourse as its focus on corruption and good governance found new
resonance in the city of Delhi. Similarly, different regional leaders are crafting
their own regionally specific responses to this larger imperative. Development
is entering electoral discourse and political strategies in varied ways. Mamata
Banerjee’s strategies to focus on specific public goods in the recently concluded
assembly elections outlined previously; Bihar’s continuing focus on development and girls; and Jayalalithaa’s attempt in Tamil Nadu to promise policies
aimed at women voters are all examples of how political actors of diverse persuasions are faced with a common imperative.
We can identify three distinct models coterminous with alternative development strategies pursued by subnational Indian states within India: the
Gujarat model, the Bihar model, and the Kerala model. The Gujarat model
was discussed during the 2014 elections and denotes higher growth rates and
investment flows.44 Recently, the Bihar model of development has emerged as
an alternative: Nitish Kumar, Bihar’s chief minister, put forward a vision of
“inclusive growth with justice,” where poorer states receive financial transfers
from the central government but are also allowed to develop their schemes
autonomously. As Kumar has stated, “a country can grow only when all the
states are allowed to grow.”45 Madhya Pradesh, a classic BIMARU state, has
also pursued some of these development actions.46 Meanwhile, the Kerala
model is a longstanding template that relies on government action to improve
its citizens’ quality of life, particularly their health indicators and education
levels.47 Clearly, many developmental models—and many issues related to development—have become necessary given the demands and aspirations of the
changing Indian voter across the length and breadth of India.

Fall/Winter 2016 • volume xxiii, issue i

199

Aseema Sinha
Conclusion
Until recently, the worlds of economic policy and elections in India operated
according to divergent logics. Governments implemented policies in pursuit
of a range of goals: self-reliance, food sufficiency, growth, fiscal stability, or
checked inflation. Political actors sought reelection by building durable vote
banks and winning coalitions. India’s multiethnic landscape offered many opportunities for identity politics and voting based on social groups. Now, the
two worlds have intersected, and elections have begun to debate development
and economic issues. The political space in India is no longer one-dimensional
and instead has become dual or even multidimensional. This article has suggested that two separate mechanisms have contributed to this trend: voters demand development and parties need to craft more stable coalitions that endure
beyond identity-driven social groups. Such development-driven responses may
be able to address the anti-incumbency trend in Indian politics but it will not
be easy to do as voters are sensitive and astute. Indian politics is in the midst of
a quiet social and economic revolution that challenges us to refine our theories,
concepts, and models of politics. WA
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